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SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE- PART I
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
Scientific evidence plays an important role in criminal trials. The forensic chemist, the pathologist, the
questioned document examiner, and the fingerprint
expert are frequently encountered in criminal practice. Moreover, the use of scientific evidence in criminal prosecutions is expanding. In the past decade
courts have faced the difficult task of ruling on the
admissibility of evidence derived from a vast array of
newly ascertained or applied scientific principles. The
following list is but a sample:
neutron activation analysis, State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St.2d
81, 246 N.E.2d 365 (1969); U.S. v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 ( 1971).
sound spectrometry (voiceprints), State v. 0 lderman, 44
Ohio App.2d 130,336 N.E.2d 442 (1975); U.S. v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
trace metal detection, State v. Daniels, 37 Ohio App.2d
4, 305 N.E.2d 497 (1973); People v. Lauro, 91 Misc.2d
706,398 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1977).
ion microprobic analysis, U.S. v. Brown, 557 F .2d 541
(6th Cir. 1977).
psychological stress evaluation, State v. Smith, 31 Md.
App. 106, 355 A.2d 527 (1976).
scanning electron microscopic analysis, People v. Palmer,
80 Cal. App.3d 239, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1978).
remote sensing evidence, U.S. v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508
(9th Cir. 1978).
bitemark comparisons, People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App.3d
100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975); People v. Milone, 43
Ill. App.3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (1976).

In addition, prior rulings on the admissibility of scientific evidence have been challenged. In some cases,
previously rejected evidence, such as polygraph examinations, has gained admissibility. See State v. Souel,
53 Ohio St.2d 123,372 N.E.2d 1318 (1978) (admissible upon stipulation); U.S. v. Riding, 350 F.
Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972). In other cases, some
well-accepted scientific techniques have been rejected.
See State v. Aquilera, 25 Crim. L. Rptr. 2189 (1979)
(radar evidence); State v. Vail, 274 N.W.2d 127
(Minn. 1979) (marihuana tests).

Scientific evidence is especially difficult to use (and
to rebut) because most attorneys lack the requisite
backgrounds in science and technology. Perhaps more
importantly, some "experts" also lack such backgrounds. This article examines some of the major
legal issues associated with the use of scientific evidence. Part II, which will appear in the next issue of
the Reporter, will focus on particular forensic techniques, such as voiceprints, gunshot residue tests,
polygraph examinations, and bitemark comparisons.
FOUNDATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The reliability of evidence derived from a scientific
principle or theory depends upon the following factors: (1) the validity of the underlying principle, (2)
the validity of the technique applying that principle,
and (3) the proper application of the technique on a
particular occasion.
Validity of the Principle and the Technique
The first two factors- the validity of the underlying principle and the validity of the technique applying that principle- are critical when considering the
admissibility of evidence derived from a novel scientific procedure. Both factors involve a question of
relevancy. See Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. Ill. L. F. 1,
14. If, for example, everyone's voice is not unique,
the results of voiceprint analysis would not tend to
establish the identity of a speaker. Or, if fear of detection does not produce certain physiological reactions, the results of polygraph examinations would
not tend to establish whether the subject of the
examination was truthful or not.
Although most courts do not distinguish between
the validity of the underlying scientific principle and
the technique's successful application of that principle, two distinct issues are present. A court, for example, could accept the underlying premise of voiceprint
identification (voice uniqueness) but not the voiceprint technique. Similarly, the underlying psychologi-
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courts, however, have adhered steadfastly to the Frye
test. See U.S. v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Peoplev.Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24,130 Cal. Rptr.
144,549 P.2d 1240 (1976); Reed v. State, 283 Md.
374,391 A.2d 364 (1978); People v. Tobey, 401
Mich. 141,257 N.W.2d 537 (1977); Commonwealth
v. Tapa, 471 Pa. 223,369 A.2d 1277 (1977).
The general acceptance test has been accepted by
the Ohio courts of appeal. A number of polygraph
cases have used the Frye test. See State v. Towns, 35
Ohio App.2d 237,301 N.E.2d 700 (1973) ("lie detector test has not yet attained scientific acceptance.");
State v. Hill, 40 Ohio App.2d 16, 317 N.E.2d 233
(1963) (polygraph has not received "scientific recognition"); State v. Smith, 113 Ohio App. 461, 463,
178 N.E.2d 605 (1960) ("lie detector has not yet attained scientific acceptance"); Parker v. Friendt, 99
Ohio App. 329,338,118 N.E.2d 216 (1954) (polygraph inadmissible because of lack of "general scientific recognition and public acceptance."). The test
has also been employed in voiceprint and gunshot
residue cases. See State v. Olderman, 44 Ohio App.2d
130, 336 N.E.2d 442 (1975) (voiceprints); State v.
Smith, 50 Ohio App.2d 183,362 N.E.2d 1239 (1976)
(gunshot residue test). Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court of Ohio has never explicitly adopted the Frye
test. In upholding the admissibility of polygraph evidence upon stipulation, the Court mentioned Frye
but gave no indication that Frye was the controlling
standard in Ohio. State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St.2d 123,
130, 372 N.E.2d 1318, 1322 (1978). Indeed, the
Court, in a footnote, quoted extensively from McCormick's critical comments. /d. at 130 n.4, 372 N. E.2d
at 1322 n.4. In a prior case, however, the Court
seemed to come close to adopting the Frye standard.
See State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St.2d 81, 85, 246 N.E.2d
365, 367 (1969) ("Neutron Activation Analysis has
not yet reached the point of generally proven reliability .... ").
'

cal and physiological principles of the polygraph
could be acknowledged without endorsing the proposition that an examiner can detect deception by means
of the polygraph technique.
The validity of the theory and the technique can
be established in several ways. First, expert testimony
concerning the validity of a particular technique could
be introduced. Second, if a technique has been sufficiently established, a court coul<;l take judicial notice
of the technique's validity, thereby relieving the offering party of the burden of introducing expert testimony on this issue. The principles underlying radar,
intoxication tests, fingerprint comparison and firearms identification have all been judicially recognized
in this fashion. See C. McCormick, Evidence 763 (2d
ed. 1972). See also City of East Clevelandv. Ferell,
168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958) (radar);
State v. Shelt, 46 Ohio App.2d 115, 120, 346 N.E.2d
345, 348-49 (1976) ( MR-7 radar device) (concurring
opinions); City of Akron v. Gray, 60 Ohio Misc. 68
(1979) (1<-55 radar device). Third, the validity of a
scientific technique could be recognized legislatively.
See R.C. 4511.19 (intoxication tests). Like judicial
notice, such a statute relieves the proponent of scientific evidence of the burden of introducing expert
testimony on the validity issue.
Typically, the validity of a novel technique must
be established through expert testimony. See Tiffin
v. Whitmer, 32 Ohio Misc. 169, 170, 290 N.E.2d 198,
199 (1970) ("Because the instrument [VASCAR] is
new, expert testimony as to the scientific principle,
construction, operation, accuracy and reliability of
the device must be established beyond a reasonable
doubt."); State v. Shelt, 46 Ohio App.2d 115, 346
N.E.2d 345 ( 1976); State v. Wilcox, 40 Ohio App.2d
380, 319 N.E.2d 615 (1974).
The General Acceptance Standard
Fryev. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), is the
leading case on the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence by means of expert testimony. In rejecting
polygraph evidence, the D.C. Circuit set forth what
has come to be known as the "general acceptance''
test. The court, in an oft-quoted passage, commented:

Several arguments have been offered to support the
general acceptance standard. First, that standard
guarantees that "a minimal reserve of experts exists
who can critically examine the validity of a scientific
determination in a particular case." U.S. v. Addison,
498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Second, the
Frye test "may well promote a degree of uniformity
of decision. Individual judges whose particular conclusions may differ regarding the reliability of particular
scientific evidence, may discover substantial agreement and consensus in the scientific community."
Peoplev.l<elly, 17 Cal.3d 24, 31,130 Cal. Rptr.144,
148-49, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (1976). Finally,
"[w]ithout the Frye test or something similar, thereliability of an experimental scientific technique is
likely to become a central issue in each trial in which
it is introduced, as long as there remains serious disagreement in the scientific community over its reliability. Again and again, the examination and crossexamination of expert witnesses will be ... protracted
and time-consuming ... and the proceedings may
well degenerate into trials of the technique itself."
Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 388, 391 A.2d 364, 37172 (1978).

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the
line between the experimental and demonstrable stages
is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone
the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while the courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduc·
tion is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs. /d. at 1014.

The court went on to hold that the polygraph had
"not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among the physiological and psychological authorities." /d.
A number of commentators have criticized the
general acceptance standard, e.g., C. McCormick, Evidence 489-90 (2d ed. 1972), and several courts have
rejected the standard. E.g., U.S. v. Baller, 519 F.2d
463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975);
State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978). Other
2

retical basis of a new test for determining the presence
of gunshot residue or to give expert testimony that
such a test was generally accepted in the scientific
community." /d. at 193, 362 N.E.2d at 1246. See
also People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24, 39, 130 Cal. Rptr.
144, 154,549 P.2d 1240, 1250 (1976) (voi.c~print expert's qualifications ~ere "those ?f a_te~~nrc1_an and
law enforcement off1cer, not a sc1ent1st. ) ; K1rk, The
fnterrelationshipofLawandScience, 13 Buff. L. Rev.
393 394 (1964) ("[T]hetechnician merely follows
pres'cribed routines, and is not expected to understand
their underlying fundamentals. He knows how, but
not why.").
Proper Application of the Technique
Once the validity of the principle and the technique
have been established, either by expert testimony or
by judicial notice, the proper_ ap~lication <;>f the technique on the particular occas1on 1~volved rn t~e ca_se
must be demonstrated. This requ1res an examrnat1on
into the condition of any instrumentation employed
in the technique, adherence to proper procedures, the
qualifications of the person conduct~ng the p:ocedure,
and the qualifications of the person rnterpretrng the
results. Generally, these conditions have been recognized by the Ohio cases. See City of East CIE:lveland v.
Ferell 168 Ohio St. 298,303, 154 N.E.2d 630,
633 958) ("There remains ... a determination as to
the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the accuracy of the particular speed meter involved in the i~
stant case and the qualifications of the person usrng
it."); City of Columbus v. Marks, 118 Ohio App. 359,
361 194 N.E.2d 791,793 (1963) ("The particularappar;tus used must be reliable" and the "test must
have been conducted and the apparatus used in a competent manner by a qualified person."); Tiffin v.
Whitmer, 32 Ohio Misc. 169, 171,290 N.E.2d 198,
200 (1970) ("The City is required to prove proper
testing and use of the device [VASCAR]"); City of
Akron v. Gray, 60 Ohio Misc. 68,69 (1979) (The
"court must consider: (1) Whether the unit was in
good operating condition at the time o~ the instant
use; (2) whether the operator of the un1t was properly
qualified; and (3) whether the ope:ator l?roperly _read
the unit."). See generally, E. lmwrnkelned, P. Giannelli, F. Gilligan, & F. Lederer, Criminal Evidence,
ch. 8 (1979).
For cases discussing the proper procedures for
breathalyzer analysis, see State v. Walker, 53 Ohio
St.2d 192,374 N.E.2d 132 (1978); State v. Steele, 52
Ohio St.2d 187,370 N.E.2d 740 (1977).

The principal justification for the Frye t~st, however is that it creates a procedure for ensunng the reliabi,lity of scientific evidence: "The requir~ment of
general acceptance in the scientific commun1ty assures that those most qualified to assess the general_
validity of a scientific method will have the determrnative voice." U.S. v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44
(D.C. Cir. 1974). Without some standard, sue~ a~
Frye, which requires a special b~rden ~o ~e. ~at1sf1~d
before innovative techniques garn admiSSibility, evidence derived from many techniques whose validity
has not been established will be admitted. As a consequence, the burden of rebutting such evidence will
fall on the opposing party -_most often the defendant. See State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 506 (Me.
1978) (dissenting opinion) (the "burden of rebuttal is
generally borne in the criminal cases by de!end_a~ts
without the economic means to marshal sc1ent1f1c
witnesses for a battle of the experts."). As the Sixth
Circuit has commented: "A courtroom is not are·
search laboratory. The fate of a defendant in a criminal prosecution should not hang on his ability to successfully rebut scientific evidence which bears an
'aura of special reliability and trustworthiness,' although, in reality the witness is t~stifying on t~e basis
of an unproved hypothesis in an Isolated expenment
which has yet to gain general acceptance in its field."
U.S. v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541,556 (6th Cir. 1977).

•
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The Qualifications of Expert Witnesses
No matter what standard of admissibility is adopted, only a person thoroughly acquainted with the_ ~n
derlying theory and its application would be qual1f1ed
to testify about the validity of a new scientific technique. This usually means a scientist must be called
as the expert. Too often, a technician, rather than a
scientist, has been permitted to testify. For example,
in State v. Daniels, 37 Ohio App.2d 4, 305 N.E.2d
497 (1973) the court upheld the admissibility of evidence based upon the trace metal detection technique.
The only person who testified about the technique
was a police officer. Although the officer was qualified to testify about the procedure used and the results obtained in that particular case, he was not qualified to testify about the validity of the technique.
Nevertheless, the officer's assertions about the validity
of the test were accepted without further scrutiny. In
contrast, the same technique was excluded in People
v. Lauro, 91 Misc.2d 706, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1977),
because there was "absolutely no testimony before
the Court as to this test having been received in any
court or in the literature of forensic science; nor is
there any scientific data presented to show the reliability of this test." /d. at 712, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
A police officer also testified in Lauro.
Another example of technician testimony is found
in State v. Smith, 50 Ohio App.2d 183, 362 N.E.2d
1239 (1967). In Smith a police officer testified that
gunshot residues were detected on the hands of the
defendant based upon the results of the Harrison-Gilroy test as modified by the officer. On appeal, the
court reversed because there was "no evidence in the
record from which it [could] be concluded that [the
officer] was qualified either to testify as to the thea-

THE RIGHT TO A DEFENSE EXPERT
In a case involving scientific evidence, the defense
counsel's most important, and perhaps most difficult,
task will be obtaining the services of a defense expert.
See U.S. v. Bailer, 519 F .2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.) cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975) ("[l]t is difficult torebut [expert] opinion except by other experts or by
cross-examination based on a thorough acquaintance
with the underlying principles"). Several developments have facilitated the task of securing expert assistance. A growing number of courts have recognized
that indigent defendants are constitutionally entitled
to expert assistance at state expense. A number of
3

generally, Anno., 6 A.L.R. Fed. 1007 (1971); 3 C.
Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 740 (1969);
Note, The Criminal justice Act of 7964- The Defendant's Right to an Independent Psychiatric Examination, 28Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 443 (1971). In Ohio,
R.C. 120.04(C) provides that the "state public defender may: (1) In providing legal representation,
conduct investigations, obtain expert testimony ...
which are appropriate and necessary to an adequate
defense .... " R.C.120.15(C) recognizes the same
authority for county public defenders.

constitutional grounds for such assistance have been
recognized. In People v. Watson, 36 111.2d 228, 221
N.E.2d 645 (1966), the court held that the compulsory process clause required the state to provide funds
for a questioned document examiner to assist the defense:
The court recognizes that there is a distinction between the right to call witnesses and the right to have
these witnesses paid for by the government, but in certain instances involving indigents, the lack of funds with
which to pay for the witness will often preclude him
from calling that witness and occasionally prevent him
from offering a defense. Thus, although the defendant is
afforded the shadow of the right to call witnesses, he is
deprived of the substance. 1d. at 233, 221 N.E.2d at
648.

DISCOVERY
Scientific Reports
Criminal Rule 16(B)(1)(d) provides for discovery
by the defense of "any results or reports ... of scientific tests or experiments .... " This type of discovery
provision is intended to cover "autopsy reports, reports of medical examinations of victims, of any psychiatric examination of accused, of chemical analyses,
of blood tests, of handwriting and fingerprint comparisons, of ballistics tests and the like." ABA Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before
Trial 67 ( 1970). The principal defect in this provision
is that it does not explicitly require disclosure of the
testing methods used by the government's expert.
Without knowledge of the testing methods, the defense cannot adequately prepare to challenge the test
results.
Several Ohio cases have addressed this problem. In
State v. Cross, 48 Ohio App.2d 357,357 N.E.2d 1103
(1975), the court stated:

Other courts have found a right to the assistance of
experts in the defendant's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. For example, in Bush v. McCollum,
231 F. Supp. 560 (D.C. Tex. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d
672 (5th Cir. 1965), the court commented: "But the
right to counsel is meaningless if the lawyer is unable
to make an effective defense because he has no funds
to provide the specialized testimony that the case requires .... In order for[the defendant} in the instant case to have the effective aid of counsel, it was
necessary for his counsel to have the assistance of a
qualified psychiatrist .... " /d. at 565. See also
Hintz v. Beta, 379 F.2d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1967);
ABA Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services 23 (1967) ("The quality of representation at trial
may be excellent and yet valueless to the defendant if
his defense requires ... [the} services of a handwriting expert and no such services are available.").
Still other courts have looked to the equal protection clause. In Jacobs v. U.S., 350 F .2d 571 (4th Cir.
1965), the court observed: "It is obvious that only
[the defendant's} inability to pay for the services of a
psychiatrist prevented a proper presentation of his
case. The Supreme Court has unmistakably held that
in criminal proceedings it will not tolerate discrimination between indigents and those who possess the
means to protect their rights." /d. at 573. Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Finally, some courts have
reached the same result on due process grounds. See
Robinson v. Pate, 345 F .2d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 1965),
aff'd in part, remanded in part on other grounds, 383
U.S. 375 (1966) ("[T}he denial of a reasonable request to obtain the services of a necessary psychiatric
witness is effectually a suppression of evidence violating the fundamental right of due process.").
See generally, Anno., 34 A. L. R.3d 1256 ( 1970);
Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense:
Expert and Investigational Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 Cornell L.J. 632 (1970); Note, Right to
Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 1054 (1963); Note, Criminal Law: Indigent Defendant's Right to Independent
Psychiatrist, 7 Tu Isa L.J. 137 ( 1971).
In many jurisdictions, the right to defense experts
is governed by statute. For example, the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964 provides for such assistance in
federal cases. 18 U.S.C. §3006(A)(e) (1976). See

We do not agree with defendant's contention that the
court's ruling with regard to the discovery of the chemist's testing methods was erroneous. Defendant, through
his letter requesting discovery, under Crim. R. 16, was
furnished all the [.eports from the chemist, ... which
were within the possession or control of the prosecutor.
The defendant knew the chemist's name and had ample
time to interview him for trial purposes by deposition, or
otherwise, to ascertain the testing methods. /d. at 360,
357 N.E.2d at 1105-06.

This passage implies that procedures for discovering
the testing methods were available but that the defendant failed to use them. The reference to the
availability of a deposition procedure, however, is
puzzling because Criminal Rule 15 limits the use of
criminal depositions to the preservation of testimony; it is not a discovery procedure. Nevertheless, the use of Criminal Rule 15 as a discovery device
has also been sanctioned by the Ohio Supreme Court.
In State v. Walker, 53 Ohio St.2d 192, 374 N.E.2d
132 (1978), the Court stated: "In Ohio, it is not
questioned that through pretrial discovery under
Crim. R. 16 the defense may obtain the name of the
individual responsible for conducting the calibration
[breathalyzer 1 test, and determine through deposition under Crim. R. 15 whether such individual utilized the proper methods in calibrating the machine."
/d. at 197, 374 N.E.2d at 135.
One other point deserves comment. Criminal Rule
16(D) imposes on the prosecution a continuing duty
to disclose. In U.S. v. Kelly, 420 F .2d 26 ( 2d Cir.
1969), the defendant moved for the production of all
4

ly critical when novel scientific techniques are introduced. The Sixth Circuit, in a case involving neutron
activation analysis, commented: " [I] f the government
sees fit to use this time consuming, expensive means
of fact-finding, it must both allow time for a defendant to make similar tests, and in the instance of an indigent defendant, a means to provide for payment for
same." U.S. v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971 ).

scientific tests. The government agreed to provide reports of drug analysis. Subsequently, the government
had the drugs tested by neutron activation analysis,
but failed to inform the defense of the new tests. The
Second Circuit reversed, finding a violation of the
government's continuing duty to disclose. The court
concluded that "fairness requires that adequate notice
be given the defense to check the findings and conclusions of the government's experts" and that the
"course of the government smacks too much of a
trial by ambush .... " /d. at 29.

~
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The Duty to Preserve Evidence
Once it is established that a defendant has the right
to reexamine scientific evidence, it follows that the
state would have a corollary duty to preserve such
evidence. Otherwise, the right to reexamination
would be meaningless. The leading case on this issue
is Peoplev. Hitch, 11 Cal.3d 159,113 Cal. Rptr.158,
520 P.2d 974, vacated, 12 Cal.3d 641, 117 Cal. Rptr.
9, 527 P.2d 361 (1974). Hitch involved the preservation of ampoules used in a breathalyzer test. According to the court, failure to adopt procedures for the
preservation of the ampoules deprived the defendant
of due process. See People v. Municipal Court (Ahnemann),12 Ca1.3d 658, 663, 117 Cal. 8ptr. 20, 22-23,
527 P.2d 372,374-75 (1974) ("[D]ue process requires
such evidence to be disclosed by the prosecution ...
[and] since the prosecution has the duty to disclose
such material evidence, the investigative agency involved in the test has the duty to preserve it for disclosure .... "). See also Garcia v. District Court, 589
P.2d 924 (Colo. 1979); State v. Michener, 25 Or. App.
523,550 P.2d 449 (1976).
The Ohio courts have yet to adopt the Hitch rationale. See State v. Watson, 48 Ohio App.2d 110, 355
N.E.2d 883 (1975); State v. Grose, 45 Ohio Misc. 1,
340 N.E.2d 441 (1975). See generally, State v. Grose:
The Right of the Accused to the Breathalyzer Test
Ampoule, 3 Ohio North. U. L. Rev. 1339 (1976).
Nevertheless, the issue is far from settled. The holding in Watson was limited; the court stated:

Disclosure of Favorable Evidence
Criminal Rule 16(B)(1 )(f) requires the prosecution
to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant upon
request. This provision follows the constitutional requirements of Brady v.. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
The leading Ohio case on this issue, McMullen v. Maxwell, 3 Ohio St.2d 160, 209 N.E.2d 449 (1965), involved the state's failure to disclose a ballistics report
showing that the defendant's gun had not fired the
fatal bullet. According to the Court, "[s] ince the excluded evidence ... was of such a substantial nature,
the failure of the prosecutor to disclose it deprived
petitioner of his right to a fair trial." /d. at 168, 209
N.E.2d at 456. Other cases applying the Brady doctrine to scientific evidence include: State v. Sahlie,
245 N.W.2d 476 (S.D. 1976) (failure to disclose existence of unidentified fingerprints); People v. Drake,
64 Mich. App. 671,236 N.W.2d 537 (1975) (failure
to disclose results of blood and urine analysis of mur·
der victim); State v. Gammill, 585 P.2d 1074 (l<an.
App. 1978) (failure to disclose results of examinations
of rape victim).
Retesting
In order to challenge scientific evidence, a defendant in many cases must have an opportunity to have
the evidence reexamined by its own expert. Criminal
Rule 16( B)( 1 )(c) provides for the inspection of tangible objects within the possession or control of the
state, and thus would appear to provide for retesting
by the defense. Moreover, a number of courts have
found that such a right is constitutionally guaranteed.
For example, in Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F .2d 744
(5th Cir. 1975), the defendant's request for inspection of a murder weapon and bullet was rejected by
the state courts. The Fifth Circuit, however, granted
the defendant habeas relief, holding: " [ F] undamental
fairness is violated when a criminal defendant ... is
denied the opportunity to have an expert of his
choosing, bound by appropriate safeguards imposed
by the Court, examine a piece of critical evidence
whose nature is subject to varying expert opinion."
ld. at 746. See also White v. Maggio, 556 F .2d 1352
(5th Cir. 1977); Warren v. State, 292 Ala. 71,288
So.2d 826 (1973); Patterson v. State, 238 Ga. 204,
232 S.E.2d 233 ( 1977); Jackson v. State, 243 So.2d
396 ( 1970): Other courts have reached the same result on nonconstitutional grounds. See James v. Comrryonwealth, 482 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1972); State v. Gaddis, 530 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn. 1975); People v. White, 40
N.Y.2d 797,358 N.E.2d 1031 (1976).
The opportunity to reexamine evidence is especial-

Therefore, we hold that while the test ampoule and its
solution used in the breathalyzer test given to the defendant may be "material to the preparation of his defense" (within the meaning of.Crim. R. 16(B)(1)(c)) and
ordinarily excludable from evidence when made unavailable to him, where there is no evidence that the ampoule
and solution, if preserved, could be scientifically examined so as to produce conclusive results, nor that it was
maliciously destroyed, the results of the breathalyzer
test may be admitted. /d. at 112, 355 N.E.2d at 885.

This passage suggests that had evidence demonstrating
the value of retesting been offered, the court would
have decided the case differently. No such evidence
was presented in Watson. /d.
More importantly, the duty to preserve evidence
has been extended beyond the breathalyzer context.
In People v. Taylor, 54 Ill. App.3d 454, 369 N.E.2d
573 (1977), heroin allegedly sold by the defendant
was consumed in an unnecessary laboratory test. The
court reversed the defendant's conviction: "We hold
... that defendant in the instant case was denied due
process of law and the opportunity for meaningful
confrontation of the witnesses against him by the
State's unnecessary destruction of the allegedly pro5

THE RIGHT TO PRESENT DEFENSE EVIDENCE
A criminal defendant's right to present defense evidence has been recognized in several U.S. Supreme
Court decisions. Such a right can be inferred from
the compulsory process guarantee. In Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), after holding that the
compulsory process clause was binding upon the
states, the Court stated: "The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if
necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense .... " /d. at 19. The right to present defense
evidence also finds support in the due process guarantee. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 ( 1 973)
(due process violated by state evidentiary rules which
precluded the defendant from introducing critical and
reliable defense evidence); Green v. Georgia, 99 S.Ct.
2150 (1 979). See generally, Westen, The Compulsory
Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 73, 149-59 (1974);
Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9
Ind. L. Rev. 711 (1976); Note, Constitutional Restraints on the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defendant's Favor: The Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73
Mich. L. Rev.1465(1975).
The right to present defense evidence has pl·ayed a
significant part in several cases involving the use of
scientific evidence. In State v. Sims, 52 Ohio Misc.
31,369 N.E.2d 24 (1977), the court found an implied
right to present defense evidence in the compulsory
process clause and concluded that that right compelled admission of defense polygraph evidence. In
State v. Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912, aff'd, 88
N.M. 184,539 P.2d 204 (1975), the court upheld the
admissibility of defense-offered polygraph evidence on
due process grounds. The court based its decision on
Chambers v. Mississippi. See generally, Clinton, The
Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in'Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev.
711, 810-15 ( 1 976); O'Connor, ''That's the Man"; A
Sobering Study of Eyewitness Identification and the
Polygraph, 49 St. John's L. Rev. 1, 27 (1 974).

hibited substance .... " /d. at 457, 369 N.E.2d at
576. See also State v. Hannah, 120 Ariz. 1, 583 P.2d
888 (1978) (destruction of evidence of arson); People
v. Gomez, 596 P.2d 1192 (Colo. 1 979) (destruction
of heroin); Jackson v. State, 249 So.2d 470 (Fla. App.
1971 ), aff'd, 280 So.2d 673 (1973) (destruction of a
bullet); State v. Wright, 87 Wash.2d 783, 557 P.2d 1
(1976) (destruction of evidence in homicide case).
See generally, Note, The Right to Independent Testing: A New Hitch in the Preservation of Evidence
Doctrine,.75Colum. L. Rev.1355 (1975);Preservation of Due Process When Evidence is Destroyed or
Tested, 53 Wash. L. Rev. 573 (1978); Comment,
judicial Response to Government Loss or Destruction
of Evidence, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 542 (1972); Government Has Duty to Implement Effective Guidelines to
Preserve Discoverable Evidence, 1971 Duke L.J. 644.
Prosecutorial Discovery
Criminal Rule 16 provides for reciprocal discovery
by the prosecution if the defense requests production
of tangible objects or the results of scientific tests.
Crim. R. 16(C)(1 )(a) & (b). These provisions, however, are more restrictive than the comparable provisions for defense discovery. For example, the defense
is entitled to all scientific reports "made in connection with the particular case," while the prosecution
is entitled to scientific reports only if "made in connection with the particular case" and the defendant
intends to introduce the evidence at trial or intends
to call a witness "when such results or reports relate
to his testimony."
Thus, if the defendant does not intend to use the
scientific evidence at trial, discovery is not required.
Nevertheless, the prosecution may learn of the existence of a defense expert and attempt to call that expert as a prosecution witness. Such a tactic runs
afoul of the defendant's right to effective assistance
of counsel as well as the attorney-client privilege. In
Statev. Mingo, 77 N.J. 576,392 A.2d 590 (1978),
the defense retained a questioned document examiner
to compare handwriting exemplars provided by the
defendant with a writing used in the commission of a
crime. The examiner concluded that the exemplars
were written by the same person. Consequently, the
defense decided not to call the expert. The prosecution, however, subpoenaed the expert and he testified
as a government witness. The New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed, resting its decision on the right to effective representation of counsel and the attorneyclient privilege. The Third Circuit reached the same
result in U.S. v_ Alvarez, 519 F .2d 1036 (3d Cir.
1 975). According to that court, the "attorney must
be free to make an informed judgment with respect to
the best course for the defense without the inhibition
of creating a potential government witness." !d. at
1047. See also Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038
(E.D.N.Y. 1976); Pouncey v. State, 353 So.2d 640
(Fla. App. 1 977). See generally, R.C. 2317 .02(A)
(attorney-client privilege); C. McCormick, Evidence
188-89 (2d ed. 1 972); 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
Weinstein's Evidence 503-26 (1975).

LABORATORY REPORTS
The admissibility of laboratory reports has been
litigated in a number of cases. The leading Ohio case
is State v. Tims, 9 Ohio St.2d 136, 224 N.E.2d 348
(1 967), in which the prosecution introduced a hospital report of the examination of a rape victim. According to the prosecution, the report was admissible
under the Business Record statute. R.C. 2317.40.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed on confrontation
grounds: "This right of confrontation includes the
right of cross-examination of the person who is the
actual witness against him. If applicable in a criminal
case, the Business Records as Evidence Act denies hin
such right." !d. at 138, 224 N.E.2d at 351. Accord,
State v. Miller, 42 Ohio St.2d 102, 326 N.E.2d 259
(1 975). In a later case, the Court li[llited Tims: "The
Tims case only involved the admissibility of hospital
records; it clearly did not set forth a general rule proscribing the introduction in evidence of all document
that may qualify as a business record." State v. Walk
er, 53 Ohio St.2d 192, 198, 374 N.E.2d 132, 136
(1978). See also Stare v. I<ehn, 50 Ohio St.2d 11,
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frisked," and does not permit a "generalized 'cursory
search for weapons'" among the occupants of the
premises to be searched. Ybarra v. 11/inois, 1 00 S. Ct.
338 (1979).

361 N.E.2d 1330 (1977); State v. Colvin, 19 Ohio
St.2d 86, 249 N.E.2d 784 (1969). The Court, however, has not overruled Tims. See generally, lmwinkelried, The Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative Laboratory Reports Against Criminal Defendants,
30 Hastings L.J. 621 (1979).
One other statutory provision is pertinent. R. C.
2925.51 provides that a laboratory report is prima
facie evidence in drug cases if the prosecutor serves a
copy of the report on the defense. Subsection (C)
provides that the "report shall not be prima facie evidence ... if the accused or his attorney demands the
testimony of the person signing the report .... " In
State v. Reese, 56 Ohio App,2d 278, 382 N.E.2d
1193 ( 1978), the prosecutor failed to serve a copy of
the laboratory report on the defense. The court held
that the statutory language was "mandatory" and
consequently, the "failure on the part of the prosecutor to properly provide a copy to defense counsel
renders such a report inadmissible." /d. at 281,382
N.E.2d at 1195.

Confrontation - Videotape Deposition
The Sixth Circuit found error in the admission at
trial of a videotape deposition taken while the defendant was in another room watching the proceedings on a monitor. On advice of psychiatrists, the victim of the crime gave her deposition "not within the
vision" of the defendant. The defendant had a buzzer
with which he could stop the questioning in order to
confer with his counsel, but the witness was unaware
of his presence. In reversing his conviction, the Court
ruled that "the accuracy of [the witness'] perception
of the events during the kidnapping and her recollection and expression of those events was crucial to the
government's case. The partial confrontation allowed
was inadequate to test those features of her testimony." U.S. v. Benfield, 25 Crim. L. Rptr. 2026
(6th Cir. 1979).

RELATED ISSUES
The scope of this article does not permit consideration of all the issues presented by the use of scientific
evidence. Nevertheless, several issues are important
enough to note briefly. First, evidence submitted to a
crime laboratory for analysis often is obtained from
the defendant. This, of course, may raise constitutional issues- principally the legality of a search or
seizure. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969)
(probable cause lacking for seizure of suspect for fingerprinting); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 321 &
338 (1979). Second, once the state has obtained evidence, from the defendant or from the crime scene,
the prosecution will be required to identify the evidence at trial. This will often require establishing a
chain-of-custody. See State v. Reese, 56 Ohio App.2d
278,382 N.E.2d 1193 (1978) ("The trial record here
utterly fai Is to establish a continuous chain of custody
[for drugs].").

Defense Witnesses
According to the First Circuit, evidence of a witness' difficulty in identifying the defendant from a
photographic array is probative and critical evidence,
even when the witness does not testify for the prosecution. The Court held that the exclusion of the witness when called by the defendant was a denial of the
Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses in one's
own behalf. Pettijohn v. Hall, 599 F.2d 476 (1st Cir.
1979).
Stop and Frisk
While stopped for a traffic offense, the defendant
made several suspicious attempts to reach something
inside his coat pocket. Consequently, the officer
reached into the defendant's coat pocket and withdrew an envelope containing stolen checks. The
Ninth Circuit held that once the police officer removed the envelope, he "had no concern that it might
contain a weapon." Therefore the "examination of
its contents was not 'an intrusion reasonably designed
to discover instruments of assault' as required by
Terry." Although reasonable at its inception, the
frisk became unreasonable because of its scope. U.S.
v. Thompson, 597 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1979).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Search & Seizure
Police, acting pursuant to a search warrant authorizing the search of a bar and one bartender for narcotics and associated paraphenafia, performed "cursory weapons searches" of the occupants of the bar.
During the frisks the officers found packets of narcotics on one of the patrons. The U.S. Supreme Court
held that the search which produced the narcotics
violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Noting that the warrant mentioned only the bar and
one bartender, the Court reasoned that the police had
no probable cause to believe that any patron would
be violating the law. In addition, the initial pat-down
could not be justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), since the frisk was not supported by a reasonable belief that the patron was armed. The Court em... · Phasized that a valid Terry frisk requires a "reasonable
. belief or suspicion directed at the person to be

Security Guard Search
The California Supreme Court held that the search
and seizure provisions of the State Constitution are
triggered when a private security guard conducts an
investigation which goes beyond the purely private
concerns of his employer and furthers a state interest.
The Court found such a case to exist where store security guards searched, seized and detained a shoplifting suspect while waiting for police to arrive. According to the Court, "when private security personnel conduct an illegal search or seizure while engaged
in a statutorily-authorized citizens arrest and detention of a person in aid of law enforcement authorities,
the constitutional proscriptions ... are applicable."
7

ence it had with the state parole board concerning its
key witnesses. The prosecutor refused to produce
any material and would not affirm or deny its existence. After trial, a letter from the prosecutor to the
parole board asking that the witness' "cooperation"
be taken into account at his parole hearing was released. Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
the prosecution must produce, upon request by the
defense, information of an exculpatory nature in its
possession. The Court held that " [t] he nondisclosure
of this evidence denied defendant his right to a fair
trial," since the jury could have found that the evid~nce indicated an ulterior motive on the part of the
Witness. People v. Cwikla, 24 Crim. L. Rptr. 2485
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1 979).

People v. Zelinski, 25 Crim. L. Rptr. 1042 (Cal. Sup.
Ct. 1 979).

.

Accomplice Testimony
At defendant's trial for assault, his alleged accomplice testified for the prosecution. When questioned
by the defense regarding a promise of leniency in exchange for his testimony, the accomplice claimed the
attorney-client privilege. On appeal, the Court held
that a promise of leniency could not be protected by
privilege. Noting that such information is "vital to
the jury for a proper evaluation of ... credibility,"
the Court held that public policy_ "demands full disclosure to the jury of the term~ of such a bargain."
Mays v. State, 25 Crim. L. Rptr. 2106 (Okla. Ct.
Crim. App. 1979).

Eyewitness Identification Instruction
The Eighth Circuit has ruled that under certain circumstances a jury instruction on the possible unreliability of eyewitness identifications should be given
See also U.S. v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir.
1972). Where "the eyewitness identification is the
sole basis for the conviction [and] there is the possibility of misidentification," the trial court should give
an instruction alerting the jury to the crucial role the
eyewitness identification plays in the case. U.S. v.
Greene, 24 Crim. L. Rptr. 2436 (8th Cir. 1 979).

Inventory Search
When the defendant was found unconscious by police in his stopped automobile, he was taken to the
hospital and the car was towed off the road where it
had been blocking traffic. During the course of a warrantless inventory search of the auto, police opened a
knapsack which was found to contain large amounts
of illegal drugs. Since the knapsack could have easily
been inventoried and stored as a unit, the Court held
that the search and inventory of the contents of the
knapsack were unwarranted in the absence of any
dan!:le_r posed to the police. Concluding that no such
ganger existed under the circumstances of the case,
the Court ruled the evidence produced by the search
was inadmissible. U.S. v. Bloomfield, 24 Crim. L.
Rptr. 2530 (8th Cir. 1979).
.

Traffic Stops- Ordering Passengers Out of Cars
The Louisiana Supreme Court has refused to extend the holding of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106 (1977) to automobile passengers. In Mimms, the
Supreme Court ruled that police may routinely, and
without probable cause, order drivers stopped for traffic offenses out of their cars. The Mimms decision
was based upon concern for the safetV of police officers enforcing traffic regulations. However, the Court
found that protection of the police from injuries
caused by passing traffic is not applicable when a passenger is involved. In addition, an automobile passenger has a greater expectation of privacy than the driver. "To give the police officer the discretion to order
the passenger from the automobile without requiring
any explanation of the officer's actions (other than a
blanket concern for personal safety in all situations) is
to abandon the requirement ofindividualized inquiry
into the reasons for an intrusion of the right to privacy secured by Article 1, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution." State v. Williams, 24 Crim. L. Rep. 2359 (La.
Sup. Ct. 1979).

Public Trial Right
The Court held that the blanket exclusion of spectators at an incest trial violated the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial. While the Court
acknowledged that such an exclusion may be acceptable during the testimony of children who are required to testify to sordid facts, the order in this case
applied for the duration of the entire trial. The Court
also ruled that the defendant did not waive his right
to a public trial by failing to renew his objection at
the end of the child's testimony. Cumbee v. Commonwealth, 25 Crim. L. Rptr. 2136 (1979).
Judicial Impartiality
The Court found plain error in the conduct of a
fe_deral trial Jud~e in ~n otherwise "routine" one-day
tnal. _The t:1al _Judge mterrupted the proceedings over
250 t1mes, mfnnged upon the cross examination by
defense counsel, interrupted defense counsel in the
first sentence of the opening statement and made expressions of "contemptuous disbelief" ~t the testimony of defense witnesses. According to the Court
"given what occurred, the judge's jury instructions '
could not offset the effects of his conduct." U.S. v.
Hickman, 24 Crim. L. Rptr. 2505 (6th Cir. 1979).
Brady Doctrine
During the defendants' trial, the prosecution was
requested by the defense to produce any correspond8

